



"Woolsack, the name given to the seat of the Lord Chancellor of England in the
House of Lords, whose essential portion is a large square bag of wool, without
either back or arms, and covered with red cloth, the whole forming a kind of cush-
ioned ottoman standing near the center of the Chamber. It is believed that woolsacks
were placed in the House of Lords in the time of Edward III to remind the peers of
the importance of England's staple trade." '
In accounting for the origin of the doctrine of undisclosed principal,
it is usually assumed that a purely legal explanation is sufficient. 2 Thus,
the formal identification of principal and agent,3 the analogy of a dormant
partner, 4 the principle of causation," equitable execution on the agent's right
of exoneration,6 the "benefit theory", 7 quasi contract 8 and the entrepreneur
basis for vicarious liability ' have all been advanced to account for the doc-
trine.' 0 These explanations are not consistent; in fact, their very number
and variety suggest a re-examination of the precedents usually cited to
establish the origin of undisclosed principal. Like so many of the rules of
agency, it is possible that the true origin of the doctrine may be found in
commercial custom.
Gonzalez v. Sladen,". decided in 1702, reported in Buller's Nisi Prius,
is regularly cited as the earliest judicial statement of the doctrine of undis-
*The writer is indebted to C. Fuller, Esquire, Assistant Librarian, London School of
Economics and Political Science, University of London, for historical references, and to
John D. O'Reilly, Law Librarian, Georgetown University, and Julius Sherman, of the Dis-
trict of Columbia bar, for assistance in the preparation of this article.
'A. B., IOI, A. M., I902, LL.B., 1907, Ph. D., 1916, Georgetown University; Assistant
Dean and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law School; member, American Law
Institute; author of articles in various legal periodicals.
1 10 CHAMBER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA (1927) 716.
2AMEs, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 4.53; HUFFCUT, AGENCY (2d ed. 19Ol)
158; 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) 1315.
, Holmes, History of Ageltcy, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
(1909) 394; Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N. Y. 625, 626, 23 N. E. 24 (1889).
'Watteau v. Fenwick, [1893] I Q. B. 346, 349.
'Lewis, The Liability of the Undisclosed Principal in Contracts (19o9) 9 CoL. L. REV.
116, 135.
'AMES, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 463.
'HuFFcuT, AGENCY 162.
'Ibid. Hubbard v. Tenbrook, 124 Pa. 291, 292, 16 Atl. 817 (1889).
'TIFFANY, AGENCY (Powell, 2d ed. 1924) 253.
" Mr. Mechem criticises the explanation offered by Dean Ames, saying: "Many practical
objections to a remedy purely equitable will, however, at once suggest themselves." 2
MECHErM, op. cit. sup'ra note 2, at 1315. William Draper Lewis says the explanation of Mr.
Huffcut "introduces a novel principle into our law. . . ." Lewis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 125.
The analogy of a dormant partner, advanced in Watteau v. Fenwick, supra note 4, is criticised
in Note (1893) 9 L. Q. REv. III.
'Bulu.m, TRIALS AT Nisi PRius (1771) 128. For the paragraph in Buller following
the passage quoted, which is also pertinent, see infra note 24. "The first case I have been
able to find on this subject is Gonzalez v. Sladen, referred to by Mr. J. Buller, as decided at
Guildhall in Trinity Term, in the first year of Queen Anne, from Sergeant Salkeld's manu-
script. Bull. N. P. 13o." Kirkpatrick v. Stainer, 22 Wend. 244, 250 (N. Y. 1839). In 1755
the obligations of the factor acting for a foreign principal were recognized and an effort
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closed principal. The passage in Buller is brief and reads as follows: "But
where a Factor to one beyond the Sea buys or sells Goods for the Person
to whom he is Factor, an Action will lie against or for him in his own
name; for the Credit will be presumed to be given to him, . . . and that
rather so, as it is so much for the Benefit of Trade." While this passage
bears the title of a case, no facts are set forth, but only the rule by which
the issue was decided. No reference is made to the rights and liabilities
of the undisclosed principal, which is the essential feature of the doctrine,
but the passage refers only to the rights and liabilities of the agent. The
principal was a foreigner, "one beyond the Sea". For aught that appears,
the same rule would have been applied, whether the principal had been dis-
closed or undisclosed. The next case is Gurratt v. Cullum, decided in 1710.12
The principal, in Ireland, employed London factors to sell goods; they did
so without disclosing the principal. Before payment was made, the factors
became bankrupt; their assets were assigned to a "commissioner in bank-
ruptcy", who obtained payment from the buyer. The principal sued the
commissioner and the court held that he could recover the price of the goods
from the commissioner. There was no occasion to decide whether an undis-
closed principal could have directly. enforced rights against the buyer, or
whether he had incurred any personal liability to the buyer. This case, there-
fore, does not touch the central rule in the doctrine of undisclosed principal,
namely, the rights and liabilities of the undisclosed principal with respect to
the third party, but deals only with the relation between the undisclosed
principal and the agent. At this time, England and Ireland were virtually
foreign countries, as a result of the political disturbances of the seventeenth
century, trade rivalries and a series of short-sighted legislative experiments
by Parliament, beginning about 1641 and including embargoes against the
importation of Irish goods.13 Gurratt v. Cullum was decided in 1710; the
principal resided in Ireland and the agent in England. Over IOO years later,
Lord Tenterden said that Scotland was a foreign country with reference to
England, under the rules of agency.14 Gurratt v. Cullum, therefore, should
be considered as involving an English agent and a foreign principal, who
was undisclosed.
Scrinishire v. Alderton,15 a cause cjl~bre in the history of undisclosed
principal, was decided in 1742. The plaintiff, a farmer in the "Isle of Ely",
shipped oats to his factor, a del credere agent, in Bear Key, for sale. The
factor sold the oats to the defendant, without disclosing his principal. Before
made at compensating for them by giving the factor a lien on goods consigned to the factor
by his foreign principal for sale. Kruger v. Wilcox, Ambler 252 (1755), cited in Houghton
v. Matthews, 3 Bos. & P. 485. 498 (18o.3). TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 267.
" Scott v. Surman, Willes 400, 405-6 (1742-43).
2I CUNNINGHAm, GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE (3d ed. 1903) 362,
et seq.; 4 HoLDsWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923) 332 et seq.
" Tenterden, C. J., in Thomson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78, 87 (1829).
22 Strange 1182 (1742).
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payment was made, the factor failed, and the farmer notified the buyer not
to pay the factor, but the buyer disregarded the notice and paid the factor
anyway. The farmer then sued the buyer for the price of the goods, and
Chief Justice Lee directed a verdict for the farmer. Though he repeated
his instructions three times, the jury refused to find as they were instructed,
and as often returned a verdict for the defendant, the buyer. Finally they
were discharged. On a new trial, a second jury again found for the de-
fendant, explaining to the pained and astonished Chief Justice that they
thought "no credit was given as between the owner and the buyer, and that
the latter was answerable to the factor only, and he only to the owner".
The "Isle of Ely", where the principal lived, is in Cambridgeshire, about
IOO miles from London; the factor operated in Bear Key, at that time one
of London's two chief markets for grain.16 The principal, therefore, was
an English farmer, not an alien, while his agent did business in the City
of London. Notwithstanding these facts, the farmer must still be consid-
ered a "foreigner" within the rule under discussion.
Scrimshire v. Alderton is cited as holding that an undisclosed principal
may enforce a contract made for him by his agent.1 7 But the case bears a
different interpretation. The first jury were discharged when they obsti-
nately refused to follow the instructions of the Chief Justice to find for
the principal, and the report of the case in Strange states that a "special
jury" was summoned for the second trial. Parliament had authorized the
calling of special juries not very long before, in 1730.-1 Blackstone ex-
plains that special juries were summoned where "the causes were of too
great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freeholders"."9 As the issue
in Scrimshire v. Alderton was of particular interest to the business world,
the special jury in the second trial was drawn from the merchants, whose
knowledge of business practice has always been accorded great deference
by English courts. 20  This explains the bold persistence of the second jury
in rejecting the instructions even of the Lord Chief Justice of England
when they ignored or conflicted with the customs of trade. The merchant-
jury in this case reasoned that the transaction was one which bound only
the agent and the purchaser, because the principal was not himself a mer-
chant, and also because the agent was virtually an independent contractor,
1 "London possessed two great corn markets, Bear Key and Queen Hithe." Westfield,
Middlemen in English Business (1915) 19 TRANSACTIONS CONN. AcAD. ARTS AND SCI. III,
152.
2 HUFFCUT, AGENCY 164.
383 GEo. II, C. 25, 15 (730), 16 STATS. AT LARGE (Pick. ed.) 168.
23 B. COMM. .57; THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW (1898) 94. Professor Thayer explains the custom of selecting juries of cooks and fish-
mongers to try a defendant accused of selling bad food. Ibid. 94.
' PALEY, PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (4th Am. ed. 1884) 285. See also AMES, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 456. In Hornby v. Lacy, 6 M. & S. 167, 170 (1817), Littledale, of counsel, said the
jury in Scrimshire v. Alderton was composed of merchants.
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having guaranteed payment to the principal.2' The report of the case does
not state why Chief Justice Lee instructed the jury to find for the principal.
He thought, it is submitted, that payment to an insolvent agent, after notice
from the real principal not to pay, was evidence of fraud 22 and, therefore,
left the purchaser still bound to the principal.23 Probably the jury of Lon-
don business men returned a verdict for the defendant because the del credere
agent sold the goods at his own risk and, therefore, they thought that credit
was given only to him.24  Certainly, during this period the London mer-
chants were hostile to the "foreigner", the man not from their own town,
and tried to retain transactions wholly in their own hands, even though
they were acting only as agent for others.2 5 Because the principal was not
disclosed, it has been assumed that Scrimshire v. Alderton necessarily in-
volved the rule of undisclosed principal. It is submitted that this is not the
true ratio decidendi of the case. Either Chief Justice Lee was wrong in di-
recting a verdict for the plaintiff, because, as the factor was a del credere
agent, the purchaser was obligated only to him and therefore was not liable
at all to the seller, the principal, or, if his ruling be correct, is it not because
payment to an insolvent agent after notice by the principal is a badge of
fraud, and leaves the purchaser still obligated to the principal? The ver-
dict of the jury, despite the attempt of a masterful judge to override them,
merely proves that they preferred to keep the control of the business of
"foreign principals" in the hands of local agents. Scrimshire v. Alderton,
Houghton v. Matthews, supra note ii.
-". . . though the purchaser of goods from a factor has a right to pay him the money,
and be discharged; yet when the principal and factor has a dispute, the buyer, with notice of
such dispute, has no right to prejudice the title of the principal." Lord Mansfield, in
Drink-water v. Goodwin, I Cowp. 252, 2.55 (1775); Barnet v. Brandao, 6 Man. & G. 630
(0843).
( See the argument of counsel in George v. Clagett, 7 T. R. 359, 161 (1797), where
Scrimshire v. Alderton is cited with Estcott v. Milward, a case involving fraud, to support
the rule that the undisclosed principal may resort to the third party, having given notice
before actual payment by the third party to the factor.
-' Commenting on Scrimshire v. Alderton, ESPINASSE, in his DIGEST OF THE LAW OF
AcTIoNS AND TRiALs AT NisI PRIUs (i8oi) 107, speaking of the verdict of the jury, says
that by the usage of trade, the factor sold at his own risk in that case. ' Following the report
of Scrimshire v. Alderton in his report of that case, Buller continues: "However, a Factor's
sale does by the General Rule create a contract between the Owner and Buyer, and therefore
if a Factor sell for Payment at a future Day, if the Owner give Notice to the Buyer to pay
him and not the Factor, the Buyer would not be justified in afterwards paying the Factor.
Yet perhaps under some particular circumstances, this Rule may not take Place, as where the
Factor sell Goods at his own Risque (i. e. answerable to the Owner ,for the Price, though it
be never paid) for in such case he is Debtor to the Owner, and not the buyer." BuLLm,
TRIALs AT Nisi PRIus (1771) 128. In this passage, Buller deduces two rules from Scrim-
shire v. Alderton, first, that the Factor binds his Principal, and second, that where the Factor
is a del credere agent selling goods at his own risk, he and not the third party is liable to the
owner. In the report of the case in Strange it is stated that Buller agreed with the verdict
of the jury. (2 Strange ii83, n. i.) See also PALEY, o'. cit. suPra note 2o, at 285. George
v. Clagett, supra note 23.
In 4 HEN. IV, c. ix (1404), onerous restrictions are imposed upon "Merchants aliens
and strangers." Commenting upon this part of the Statute, Sir William Ashley says: "It
will be noticed that the London citizens retained their monopoly of retail trade, even against
their fellow-subjects." ASHLEY, EconTomIc HISTORY AND THEORY (1914) 16. The mer-
chant of one town, therefore, was opposed to the entry of any "outsider", not of his own
town, whether alien or native.
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in which the principal was a foreigner, does not necessarily involve the rule
of undisclosed principal, whether we agree with the jury or with the judge.
In de Gaillion v. l'Aigle 26 decided in 1797, a married woman, living
in England, made a contract in writing in her own name, for her husband,
a Frenchman, who was abroad at the time. The plaintiff knew the wife
was acting for her husband. In holding the wife personally liable on the
contract, Chief Justice Eyre said: "I am not aware that I have ever con-
curred in any decision in which it has been held that if the person describ-
ing himself as agent for another residing abroad, enter into a contract here,
he is not personally liable on the contract." The Chief Justice says, there-
fore, that the agent of a foreign principal is liable even though his principal
be fully disclosed.
In these four cases the courts discussed the relation between the agent
and his undisclosed principal (Gurratt v. Cullum) and the relation between
the agent and the third party (Gonzalez v. Sladen and de Gaillion v. l'Aigle).
In the fourth case, Scrimshire v. Alderton, there was also an undisclosed
principal but that case was decided either on the ground of a fraudulent
payment to an insolvent agent, taking the court's view, or, adopting the
view of the merchant-jury, upon the prejudice against the "foreigner", the
man not from the same town. None of these precedents, therefore, deals
directly with the rule of undisclosed principal. But every one of them, which
are all regularly cited to establish the doctrine of undisclosed principal, did
involve foreign traders who dealt through native or English agents. This
is confirmed by a contemporary text, Bacon's Abridgement (1798) which
cites these four cases and states as follows the rule they establish: "And
if a person, describing himself as agent for another residing abroad, enter
into a contract here, he will be personally liable." 27 This is the rule of
"foreign principal" and it will be noted that, according to this rule, the
English agent is bound when he acts for a foreign principal, even though he
discloses his principal. In Gurratt v. Cullum and in Scrimshire v. Alderton,
the foreign principal was not disclosed, but this fact was not decisive. The
failure to disclose that the principal was a foreigner, however, was not acci-
dental; on the contrary it was customary at that time. To explain the prac-
tice of concealing the foreign principal, a brief glance at the history of the
period is necessary.
I Bos. & P. 357, 368 (797, 1798, 1799).
.5 BAcoN, Naw ABRIGMENT OF THE LAW (798) 391. Modern authority concurs in this
statement of the rule, "although the contract discloses the principal and the fact of the
agency." HuFFcuT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 236. In the rule of ,foreign principal, the judges
put restrictions on the English factor. Another illustration of the same action is found in
decisions of the same period, stating that a factor with authority to sell cannot bind his
principal by pledging the goods. This rule originated in the case of English factors acting
for foreign principals. Note (1927) 12 MrNN L. Rs v. 633, 634. "He who sends his goods
to this country for sale ought to be secure in the confidence he reposes in the honesty of our
merchants." Duclos v. Ryland, 5 J. B. Moore 518, 523 (1821).
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Commercial History of the Rule
The struggle between the foreign merchant and the Englishman for
the trade of the Kingdom is an interesting chapter in the romance of com-
merce.28 Civilization progressed in medieval England from the manor and
the village to the town, as a social center. In fact, the country was so thinly
populated that virtually all industrial and commercial life was concentrated
in the towns. The townspeople strove to monopolize trade within the walls
of their own town, and to exclude all outsiders. Indeed, in that day, a
"foreigner" meant a man from another town, whether it was situated in
England or in some other country. 29 "Foreigners" were permitted to trade
in a town when they brought in goods the townspeople would buy and
when they bought goods the townspeople had for sale; they were most
unwelcome when they tried to monopolize local trade, by selling at retail
or by dealing with other "foreigners". 30 In fact, from the time of Edward
I (1272-1307) the English merchant had tried to compel the "foreigner"
to sell at wholesale only, and to prevent him from interfering with local
merclants by taking up retail trade.31 Dislike of "foreigners" was inten-
sified by the fact that they often escaped the payment of taxes. At first,
taxes were collected by the sheriffs, but they abused their office, and finally
the people of each town were held responsible collectively for the royal rev-
enues. 2  Whether he was a native Englishman from another town, or an
alien, the "foreign" merchant, not being a householder, came and went, en-
joying town-privileges, without paying his share of town-taxes. The towns-
people also feared that the well organized foreign merchants would combine
and raise prices. During this period, the power of the guilds was growing
and they strove to limit the privilege of buying and selling in London, and
in other markets, to guild members, that is, to London merchants. 33 No one
was admitted to a guild unless guild members went surety for him, and the
"foreigner" soon learned that native merchants were loath to admit him
to their guilds. 34  Despite the hatred of foreigners, trade with them had
'AsHLEY, ECONOMlC HISTORY AND THEORY (1914) 8 et seq.; ASHLEY, ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION OF ENGLAND (1914) 7o et seq.
I See I HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923) .54o et seq. for a discus-
sion of this theme, where it is stated that the towns used their advantages contrary to the
best interests of the country's foreign trade. "A stranger, commonly called a foreigner in a
parish, was a rare and unpleasing phenomenon"; ROGERS, INDUSTRIAL AND COMMECIcAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1892) 396; Churchill, The Crozot and the Alien (192o) 36 L. Q. REv.
402, 404. "Merchants of the fair, both natives [i. e. men of St. Ives, as contrasted with
foreigners, i. e. outsiders, those not belonging to the vill] and foreigners." Plea in the Fair
of St. Ives (1311). I SELECT CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT (I270-I638), 23 SELDEN SO-
CIETY (1908) 89.
'DAY, HISTORY OF COIIERCE (1922) 44 et seq.
"Ibid. 48.
I CUNNINGHAM, Op. cit. spra note 13, at 215. I HALL, A HISTORY OF THE CUSTOM-
REVENUE IN ENGLAND (1892) 90. I Laws of Edward the Confessor, Libertas Civitatum,
Thorpe i31, quoted in I CUNNINGHAM, op. cit. supra note 13, at 131, note I.
I CUNNINGHAM, op. cit. supra note 13, at 190, 216.
DAY, op. cit. supra note 30, at i1O.
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distinct advantages, for England depended largely on the import of foreign
goods during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.35 The alien merchant
also found a ready market for the distribution of English wool and other
products abroad, and he was eager to lend money in return for royal protec-
tion.36 Under pressure of one or another of these conflicting interests,
national policy toward the alien trader wavered from severe restrictions
on the one hand, to the grant of liberal concessions on the other, for several
hundred years after the Great Charter of Henry III (1225).3 7 Finally,
in 1392, the London merchants carried a measure "after their own hearts"
and obtained from the King and Parliament the Statute of 16 Richard IIy
The pertinent sections read as follows:
"(6) It is ordained and assented, That no merchant stranger
alien shall sell, nor buy, nor merchandize within the realm with an-
other strange merchant alien, to sell again, (7) nor that no strange
merchant alien shall sell to retail within the same realm, . "
This Statute was in force certainly as late as 1627, because in that year Par-
liament expressly repealed the tenth section of it.3 9 The hostile attitude of
the English merchant toward the alien trader must have been still alive,
therefore, in 1702, when the series of precedents under discussion began
m Ibid.
' "On the whole, the King. the prelates and barons support the merchants; they are
useful, they lend money, they lower prices, they will pay for favors." I POLLOCK AND MAIT-
LAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 464.
32 ASnrHLy, op. cit. supra note 28, at 14 et seq. Professor Holdsworth explains that
the lack of consistency in the regulation of foreign trade during this period was due to the
fact that ". . the statutes were passed rather in the interests of the consumer. The alien
was encouraged to settle and trade, in spite of the protests of the chartered boroughs. At the
end of the fourteenth century, another economic theory began to prevail. Restrictions were
laid upon the dealings of aliens. They were not allowed to trade in retail." 2 HoLDswoRTH,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 471.
as 16 RICH. II, c. I (1392). "The chief point for which they pressed was a limitation of
the freedom of aliens, especially their freedom to compete with Englishmen in internal trade,
and to sell by retail. The deeply rooted objection to the upland man, which shows itself in
the earliest municipal laws, appears here in a later form; men who bore the burdens of the
town had a right to the gains which came from its trade. The men of London put their case
very strongly in 1372, when they urged that they could not meet the royal demands if their
ancient charters were infringed by the privileges newly granted to aliens. They took a very
early opportunity of bringing their grievances before Richard II, who reaffirmed their ancient
privileges. . . . the statute of 1378, . . . forbids the aliens to sell wine or other imported
merchandise by retail in London or other towns, though it gave them considerable freedom
at fairs for selling by retail and selling to one another. Subsequently the privileges of aliens
were reaffirmed by statute and the charters of boroughs set aside in their favor, but in the
end the citizens were too strong for them, and carried a measure after their own heart, for
it prohibited aliens from selling to one another and from selling by retail." I CUNNINGHAM,
op cit. supra note x2, at 392. I HALL, op. cit. supra note 32, at 99. ANDERSON, HISTORICAL
AND CHRONOLOGICAL DEDUCTION OF THE ORIGIN OF COMMERCE (1763) 386 et seq. 4 HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. suPra note 29, at 316 et seq. There is a close parallel to be found in the laws
of at least one foreign country, Denmark, whose Trading Act (Act of May 23, 1873), § 36,
provides, in effect, that foreign traders are permitted to sell goods by means of a Danish com-
mission agent who has a license, provided that it is not permitted to retail goods for the ac-
count of a foreigner. XX COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD (1913) 29.
so3 CAR. I, c. 4. 27 (1627) 7 STATS. AT LARGE (Pick. ed.) 331. Though it must have
become obsolete by desuetude long before, the Statute of Richard II was not formally re-
pealed until 1863. 26 & 27 VICr., c. 125 (1863).
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with Buller's report of Gonzalez v. Sladen. The collection of debts in for-
eign countries must also have been very difficult in the seventeenth century,
and this supplied another reason for excluding the foreign principal and for
holding the English agent liable on contracts.
Had these sections of the Statute of Richard II been literally obeyed,
the whole retail trade of the Kingdom would have passed into the hands
of English merchants. What actually happened was that the foreigner con-
tinued to trade at retail, but to avoid the Statute, he was now compelled to
transact business through English merchants, who were really agents, but
who posed as principals.4 0  This statute, therefore, gave the English mer-
chant a very strong motive to conceal his agency when he acted for for-
eigners in domestic commerce.
With respect to foreign commerce, another statute, of the same period,
also recognized the practice of English merchants to conceal their foreign
principals. As pait of a program to favor the English importers, Parlia-
ment imposed heavier duties on goods brought in by foreigners than by
Englishmen. Smuggling excelled among the fine arts of crime in that age,
and the practice grew up of defrauding the revenue by entering in the names
of English importers goods which actually belonged to foreigners. So
common was this practice that it acquired a name,-"coverture". Finally
a statute was passed in 1486, requiring goods to be entered in the name of
the real owner.41 "This measure", says Professor Hall, "was intended to
defeat collusion between native and alien merchants, the latter of whom
paid a higher subsidy than the native." 42 The statute was repealed in 1503
when a general act was passed restoring privileges to foreign merchants.
4 3
The reign of Elizabeth (1562-1603) saw the rapid development of com-
merce which was to make English merchants "the carriers of the world". 44
By that time English merchants began to be more than a match for foreign
traders, and the fear of foreign competition largely disappeared.
This transition is illustrated in two cases, often cited, growing out of
the same transactions. In 18io, a Spaniard, Gandasequi, employed an Eng-
, ,,. .. it was irksome . . . to find in every bargain between an Englishman from the
country and an alien, a London citizen had to be called in to act as intermediary." AsHLEY,
op. cit. supra note 2.5. For an interesting discussion of this theme, see I CRAiK, HISTORY OF
BRITISH ComERcE (1844) 126 et seq. "Middlemen were a prominent feature of the trade
and behind them stood great foreign capitalists." PLUcKNETT, A CoNcisE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW (1929) 68.
'3 HEN. VII, c. vii, 7 (1486). 4 STATS. AT LARGE (Pick. ed.) 32.
2 2 HALL, op. cit. suPra note 32, at 124. Speaking of "coverture", Professor Hall says:
"Another favorite and indeed necessary precaution against foreign influence was that of
enactments against 'coverture' a collusion of denizen merchants with their alien brethren to
defraud the Crown of its rightful customs." Ibid. 1o4. The preamble to the Statute of 3
HN. VII, c. 7, refers to entry of goods to be made in the merchant's own name, to avoid
"coverture" with aliens. 4 STATS. AT LARGE, (Pick. ed.) 33. "Strict precautions were also
taken against 'coverture' or a secret agreement by which aliens conducted their trade through
the agency of natives." 2 TRAIL, SOCIAL ENGLAND (190.) 112.
41 i9 HEN. VII, c. 23 (1503), 4 STATS. AT LARGE (Pick. ed.) 1o2.
"1 GREEN, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE (189i) 394.
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lish firm to buy goods for him from London merchants. Goods were sup-
plied by two merchants and when payment was not made, they sued the
Spaniard. The defense was that the contract, by the rule of "foreign prin-
cipal", was between the plaintiffs and the English agent. Lord Mansfield
heard one case (Addison v. Gandasequi) 4' with a special jury. It was
proved that the contract was not in writing 4' and that the plaintiff knew
that the Spaniard was the real party in interest. Mansfield left it to the
jury to decide whether the rule of foreign principal ought to apply, and
they found for the defendant, the Spanish merchant, that is, they applied
the rule of foreign principal and discharged the Spanish merchant. The
second case was heard by Lord Ellenborough (Paterson v. Gandasequi). 7
During the argument, he remarked that as a judge he had heard many cases
where the rule of foreign principal was applied, and he promptly instructed
the jury, on virtually the same facts as in the case before Lord Mansfield,
to find for the defendant, the foreign principal. This was reversed on ap-
peal, the court finding that the facts were not so clear as Lord Ellenborough
thought they were at the trial, though no doubt was expressed as to the rule
of foreign principal itself. Lord Ellenborough, then, applied the rule of
foreign principal, in its original force, as a rule of absolute non-liability
when he directed a verdict for the foreign principal. Lord Mansfield, in
the same year (1812), left it to the jury to decide whether the rule should
apply. The two cases mark the beginning of a departure from the old form
of the rule that the foreign principal would not, as matter of law, be ac-
cepted as a party to the contract, but that his English agent would be held
liable. 48  At this time, the rule of foreign principal was developing into
the rule of undisclosed principal.
As the control of the commerce of the Kingdom began to pass into
the hands of English merchants, judges left it to the jury to decide whether
the parties intended that the foreign principal should be bound, that is, they
concluded that the English merchant could hold his own in the market
against foreign competitors without much assistance from the courts, and
left the parties to make their own contracts.
Citing Gonzalez v. Sladen, de Gaillion v. l'Aigle and Paterson v. Gan-
dasequi, Judge Story, in 1839, in his work on Agency, refers to the rule of
foreign principal as follows: ". . . the general rule that agents or factors,
acting for merchants, resident in a foreign country, (as for example in
France or Germany) are held personally liable upon all contracts made by
'54 Taunt. 574 (812).
." This was pointed out in the argument in Green v. Kopke, 18 C. B. 549, 550, 55, (1856).
47 15 East 62 (1812).
'These two cases are reprinted in several casebooks to introduce the subject of undis-
closed principal. There is discussion in the opinions of election, part of the rule of undis-
closed principal. These cases also involve the rule of foreign principal, to which Lord
Ellenborough, and Justices LeBlanc and Bayley expressly refer. MECHEM, CASES ON
AGENCY (1893) 545; GODDARD, CASES ON AGENCY (2d ed. 1925) 677.
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them for their employers and this without any distinction whether they
describe themselves in the contract as agents or not." 4' It will be noted
that Judge Story expressly says that the rule is the same whether the for-
eign principal is disclosed or undisclosed. He speaks of the rule as so strong
as almost to amount to a conclusive presumption of law."° But, with his
usual caution, he qualifies this by saying "the presumption may be rebutted
by evidence".
These passages from Story and the early cases were relied upon by
counsel in Mahony v. Kekule "5 (1854). In that case an English agent,
acting for a French firm, hired another Englishman, in London, to work
in France. The French firm defaulted and the Englishman sued the Eng-
lish agent, Kekule, who had signed the contract of employment as follows:
"For Vacher & Tilly, Charles Kekule." The court said that whether the
agent was liable was all a matter of the intention of the parties, that is, the
non-liability of the foreign principal was no longer assumed conclusively,
as a matter of law; it was now coming to be regarded as a question of fact,
that is, of "the intention of the parties". Two facts tended to prove this
intention,-the mode of signature and the fact that the principal was a for-
eigner. All the judges put the emphasis on the' mode of signature, showing
that they considered the intention of the parties more important than the
fact that the principal was a foreigner. Chief Justice Jervis said: "Ordi-
narily, when an English agent contracts on behalf of a principal residing
abroad, the agent is prima facie considered to pledge his own credit, . . ." -2
The agent was held not liable. Two years later the court again considered
the rule of foreign principal in Green v. Kopke '3 (1856) and again refused
to hold the agent liable. There the London agent of a German merchant
agreed in London to sell tar to the plaintiff. In the notes the agent was
expressly described as agent, and his principal was named. The plaintiff
sued the agent and relied on the fact that the principal was a foreigner, con-
tending that he had a right to hold the agent, despite the wording of the
contract. Chief Justice Jervis repeaied his earlier statement that it was all
a question of the intention of the parties and, on the facts of the case, dis-
charged the agent5 4 At this stage in the growth of the rule, the courts
were ready to let the parties decide whether they would accept the liability
of the foreign principal.'5
" STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (1839) 268.
'Ibid. 290.
14 C. B. 390 (1854).
SIbid. 398.
Supra note 46.
Ibid. And see Risbourg v. Bruckner, 27 L. J. C. P. 9o, 92 (1858).
During the argument in Gillett v. Offor, 18 C. B. 905, 915 (i856), Chief Justice Jervis
expressed a doubt whether the rule of foreign principal existed. In Heald v. Kenworthy, IO
Ex. 739 (I855), Baron Parke said emphatically that the rule of foreign principal was one of
fact, not of law. That the rule was in transition is also shown by the statements of as acute
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This application of the rule is contrary to the earlier cases where the
judges disregarded the intention of the parties, and, applying what they
evidently thought were sound rules of economic and commercial policy,
rejected the liability of the foreign principal and held the English agent,
even though the agent disclosed his principal. They frankly imposed a bur-
den on the Englishman who undertook to sell or buy goods for a foreigner.
It was a rule to reduce the pressure of foreign competition in the home
market, by imposing a burden on the Englishman who acted for foreigners.
Chief Justice Jervis now makes the hardship of obligating the English agent
a reason for holding the foreign principal.
Modern Development of the Rule
These opinions of Jervis were ignored by a group of later cases, in
which Justice Blackburn discussed the rule of foreign principal in his vig-
orous way. He first dealt with the subject in Ireland v. Livingston "1 (1871)
where a Liverpool merchant employed a commercial agent in Mauritius to
buy 500 tons of sugar there for shipment to England. The agent could
procure only 393 tons. The principal refused to accept the shipment; the
agent sued him, and the House of Lords required the principal to pay the
agent what the 393 tons had cost him. The facts called only for an inter-
pretation of the order the agent received from the principal, who was not
disclosed in the transaction. But Lord Blackburn discussed and applied the
rule of foreign principal, saying that "persons who supply goods to a com-
mission merchant sell them to him, and not to his unknown foreign cor-
respondent, and the commission merchant has no authority to pledge the
credit of his correspondent for them". As the agent in Mauritius became
liable for the goods there, it was fair to permit him to recover, in turn, from
his principal. Justice Blackburn developed the rule further in Armstrong
v. Stokes '7 (1872). It was inconvenient, he thought, to hold that an English
merchant had authority to create privity of contract between his foreign
principal and the home suppliers of the goods. It has long been settled, he
said, in effect, that a foreign principal does not give his agent any authority
to pledge his credit. This rule was originally (and in strictness, perhaps,
still is) a question of fact; but the inconvenience of not having such a rule
justified the court, he thought, in treating it as matter of law. When
he spoke of inconvenience, Lord Blackburn meant the inconvenience of com-
pelling the third party to sue the foreigner.
a judge as Maule. In Peterson v. Ayre, 13 C. B. 353, 366 (1853), he questioned the existence
of the rule, whereas four years before, in 1849, in Srnyth v. Anderson, 7 C. B. 21, 33, Justice
Maule spoke of the rule of foreign principal as "well known".
IL. R. 5 H. L. 395, 408 _(871).
WL. R. 7 Q. B. 598, 605 (872).
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In Elbinger Actien Gesellschaft v. Claye ss (1873) the foreign prin-
cipal sued an English firm. A Prussian company, the plaintiff, through a
London commission merchant, contracted for railway wheels and axles, to
be supplied by an English iron founder, who knew that the Prussian com-
pany was the real party in interest, though the contract in terms bound the
London agent. Most of the material ordered was not delivered on time,
and the Prussian company, the undisclosed, foreign principal, sued the Eng-
lish iron founder for breach of contract. The court held that, according
to the rule of foreign principal, there was no contract between the foreign
principal and the iron founder, and they held for the defendant. In the
course of his opinion, Lord Blackburn said that "the usage of trade, estab-
lished for many years,59 has been that it is understood that the foreign con-
stitutent has not authorized the merchants to pledge his credit to the contract,
to establish privity between him and the home supplier . . . ." Some
cases have taken a distinction between a foreign principal who is buying,
and one who is selling, and it has been said that the usage applies only when
the foreign principal is buying.60 According to this view, the case of
Elbinger Actien Gesellschaft v. Claye is a correct application of the rule of
foreign principal, for in that case the foreign principal was buying. The
larger question is not so much whether the foreign principal was buyer or
seller, but what importance is to be given to the fact that the English agent
is acting for a foreigner.61 In Hutton v. Bulloch 62 (1874) the rule of
foreign principal was acknowledged as "consistent with the general usage
of the trade", and Lord Blackburn's earlier statement of the rule in the lower
court was approved.
In none of these cases, so far as the reports show, was there any formal
proof of the existence of a custom to hold the English agent rather than his
foreign principal. All the judges proceed on the assumption that the trade
custom de facto existed. Chief Justice Jervis in 185o, Lord Blackburn
in 1870, and still later Justice Bray in 1917, apparently were content to draw
on their own experience at the bar and on the bench for their knowledge
of the custom. Perhaps a better explanation would be that the English
judges decided that the custom existed by determining whether it was rea-
rSL. R. 8 Q. B. 313, 317 (0873).
9 Mutton v. Bullock, L. R. 8 Q. B. 331, 334 (1873).
Miller, Gibb & Co. v. Smith & Tyrer, Ltd., [1917] 2 K. B. 141, 162.
'Ibid. 163. As late as i8gi, the Court of Appeal held that the fact that the defendant
knew or had reason to believe that the person with whom he was dealing was acting as agent
does not affect the presumption. New Zealand & Austr. Land Co. v. Watson, 7 Q. B. D. 374
(1881).
. L. R. 9 Q. B. .572. 57. (1874). Contemporary opinion did not agree with Lord Black-
burn that the custom of rejecting the foreign principal was generally followed. In the
SoLIcrroa's JOURNAL & REPORTER of January 3, 1874, it was said, editorially, speaking of these
rulings of Lord Blackburn regarding foreign principals, that it "would be extremely perilous
to lay down an absolute rule of law upon matters which ought to be governed by the usage
of those concerned, . . ." (1874) 18 SOL. J. i68. And see Dramburg v. Pollitzer, 28 L. T.
(N. S.) 470 (1873).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
sonableA3 So, Chief Justice Jervis, in 1850, was impressed by the incon-
venience to the English agent of holding him liable on contracts made for
the foreign principal; for this reason he rejected the rule as a trade custom.
In the cases in which he discussed the rule, the agent dearly contracted as
agent for a foreign principal. The older authorities would have held the
agent liable notwithstanding that fact. With them, the foreign principal
was persona non grata, whether he was disclosed or undisclosed. On the
other hand, Lord Blackburn, in 187 o , thought it inconvenient to the third
party not to hold the English agent, and he accepted the custom as valid.
Chief Justice Jervis started with the assumption that the foreign principal
was liable, and put the burden of substituting the English agent upon the
third party. Lord Blackburn began by taking the liability of the English
agent for granted, and required the third party to prove that he intended to
deal with the foreign principal instead of with the English agent. Chief
Justice Jervis made much of the unreasonableness of the custom; Lord
Blackburn accepted it as reasonable. When courts discuss the reasonable-
ness of custom, they are really considering whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to prove it, that is, whether it really exists in fact. In the vicissitudes
of trade, probably the custom of rejecting the foreign principal was dying
out when Chief Justice Jervis was on the bench, and revived in Lord Black-
burn's time, chiefly through his vigorous support of it.64  That the custom
was fast dying out is proved by the decision in Gadd v. Houghton " (1876)
where the defendants, fruit brokers in Liverpool, sold fruit to the plaintiff,
another Liverpool merchant, on behalf of a Spanish firm. The sold note
referred to the Spanish firm by name, but it was signed unqualifiedly by the
defendant, the agent. The Court of Appeal unanimously held for the de-
fendant, the English agent of the foreign principal. While the plaintiff
contended for the rule of foreign principal, the court failed to apply it. The
foreign principal was selling in this instance; possibly this accounts for the
failure of the opinion to cite earlier precedents which discuss the rule where
the foreign principal was buying. Beginning, then, with the time of Chief
ALLE=, LAW IN THE MAKING (2d ed. 193o) 97.
The opposition between their views is drawn into a focus by the following quotations
from their opinions: "It is ridiculous to suppose that an agent for a mere commission of one-
half per cent. would guarantee the performance of a contract for the sale of iooo barrels of
tar." Chief Justice Jervis in Green v. Kopke, supra note 46. ". . . the inconvenience of
holding that privity of contract was established between a Liverpool merchant and the
grower of every bale of cotton which is forwarded to him in consequence of his order given
to a commission merchant at New Orleans, or between a New York merchant and the sup-
plier of every bale of goods purchased in consequence of an order to a London commission
merchant, is so obvious and so well known . . ." Lord Blackburn in Armstrong v. Stokes,
supra note .57. The English agent, it was thought, could protect himself better than third
parties who dealt with him, or as stated in a recent article: ". . . the agent, if held per-
sonally liable, has had the opportunity of satisfying himself as to the financial standing of
the foreign trader for whom he has ordered or sold goods or entered into other obligations."
Agents for Foreign Principals (1929) 73 SOL. J. 358.
w L. R. I Ex. D. 3.57 (1876). See comment in this case in (919) 4 MINN. L. REv. 244.
Compare Wright, Opposition of the Law to Business Usages (1926) 26 CoL- L. REv. 917, 922.
FOREIGN PRINCIPALS
Justice Jervis (1854), the rule of foreign principal was solemnly discussed,
but quietly ignored in deciding cases. Subsequent opinions dealing with
this problem follow the same method.
With the modern organization of international trade, English mer-
chants were ready to accept the credit of foreigners. This is reflected in
decisions, beginning in 189o, where the courts said that the question whether
the English agent of a foreign principal was liable depended on the intention
of the parties. In Hahn v. North German Pitwood Company 66 (1892),
where the British agent of a German principal was sued, the decision, it was
said, turned not on a custom of trade, but on the "construction" of the con-
tract, and the agent was held not liable. "It is always a question of fact",
said Justice Charles, in Glover v. Langford 17 (1892) speaking of the rule
of foreign principal, and discharged the British agent of a Russian principal,
because the contract showed he was acting for another party. Where a
London agent acted for Calcutta merchants, signing his name to the con-
tract not as an agent, but as an individual, the Court of Appeal, in Flinn
v. Hoyle Is (1893), held the foreign principal liable. Harper v. Keller "9
(1915), grew out of the World War. The defendant, the English agent of
the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company, ordered coal from the plaintiff for the
Steamship Kaiser William II, which belonged to the German company.
The plaintiff supplied the coal, and when payment was not made, he sued
the English agent.. The court said the fact that the principal was a foreigner
created a presumption that the British agent was liable on the contract. But
the wording of the contract and the surrounding circumstances, showed that
the foreign principal, not the English agent, was the party intended to be
held liable. The latest discussion of the rule by an English court is in
Miller, Gibb & Co. v. Smith & Tyrer, Ltd.70 (1917). Here the plaintiffs
bought lumber under a written contract, in which the defendants, British
agents, clearly described themselves as agents, but did not name their prin-
cipal, an American firm. When the contract was not performed, the plain-
tiffs sued the British agents. There was no proof of any special custom
and the plaintiffs were forced to rely, therefore, on the general custom of
merchants to hold the defendant. The court held that the agents were not
liable, reasoning that the terms of the contract did not make them a party,
and, assuming that the custom did exist, it was inconsistent with the con-
tract and therefore could not prevail. To rebut the custom, which is no
longer called a rule, it was only necessary for the British agent to contract
in terms as agent. Bray, J., said, speaking of the usage: "Many years have
elapsed since Blackburn, J., stated that there was the usage. Trade has
°'8 T. L. R. 557 (892).
'8 T. L. R. 628, 629 (1892).
m63 L. J. (N¢. s.) 1 (1893).
c84 L. J. K. B. 1696 (1915)."'Supra note 6o.
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changed greatly and has increased enormously. My experience at the bar
and on the Bench in the Commercial Court leads me to doubt whether this
usage still exists. British firms and companies do not hesitate to make con-
tracts with foreign firms and companies, whether negotiated or not through
British agents. British agents are loath to make themselves personally re-
sponsible for their foreign principals." In this case, the contract recited
that it was entered into by agents and the agents signed expressly in that
capacity. In Mercer v. Wright,7' decided in 1917, the contract recited that
it was made with the defendant, as agent, but the defendant signed as an
individual. On authority of Miller v. Smith the court discharged the agent,
who had acted for a foreign principal.
The Rule in the United States
The rule of foreign principal has had an interesting development in the
United States, beginning with the case of Kirkpatrick v. Stainer'72 decided
by the Court for the Correction of Errors of New York in 1839, to the most
recent discussion in McKeen v. Boothby73 decided by the Supreme Court
of Maine, October 28, 193o. At first the American courts were swayed
by English precedents cited by Story in his work on Agency,7 4 and they
applied the rule without stopping to inquire whether it had ever been applied
by merchants in this country as a trade custom. Later editions of Story
modified his very positive statement of the rule in the earlier editions, and
this revision was followed by a change in the position taken by some courts.
Today, the rule of foreign principal does not prevail in the United States,
and the agent of a foreign principal contracts here on the same footing as
the agent of a domestic principal.
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In several cases, it was urged that the rule should be applied where the
agent did business in one state and the principal resided in another state.
ra 33 T. L. R. 343 (1917). It has been said recently, in effect, that the rule of foreign
principal is confined to cases where the principal is undisclosed. See Agents for Foreign
Principals, suPra note 64, at 358. But in Addison v. Gandasequi, supra note 45, Mansfield
refused to set aside a verdict where a jury had applied the rule of foreign principal, and in
Paterson v. Gandasequi, supra note 47, Ellenborough was ready to instruct as matter of law
that the foreign principal was not liable. In both cases the foreign principal was fully dis-
closed. The early precedents expressly approved the rule, whether the foreign principal was
disclosed or undisclosed, because in that period the foreign principal was persona non grata.
It was only when the foreign principal became acceptable as a party to a contract that the
point was raised as to the failure to disclose his identity. The making of this distinction
marks the shading off of the rule of foreign principal (the undesired principal), into the
later rule of undisclosed principal. The rule of foreign principal has been applied in Canada,
Shepard v. Mathers, 2 D. L. R. 4.57 (1926); Taylor v. Davenport, 14 West. L. Rep. 257
(i91o), British Columbia. For Victoria, see Cheong v. Lohmann, [197] Vict. L. Rep. 571.
" Supra note I1.
152 Atl. 53 (Me. i93o).
'*STORY, AGENCY (1st ed., 1839) §268. Story cites Bull. N. P., 13o, deGaillion v.
l'Aigle, supra note 26; Paterson v. Gandasequi, supra note 47; Thomson v. Davenport, supra
note 14.. See also 2 KENT, Co-NIM. (12 ed. Holmes) *631.
n 2 MECHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) 2174; ANsoN, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) 551;
REINHARD, AGENCY (1902) 118; HUFFuT, AGENCY (2d ed. i9ol) 236.
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It has uniformly been held, however, that the rule of foreign principal has
no application in this more narrow aspect.7 1 It is only a forlorn hope, there-
fore, that the rule of foreign principal will be accepted in the United States.
This is only to be expected, for the rule was developed under conditions in
England which have gradually passed away in that country, and which have
never obtained here.
This situation was recognized in the first American case discussing the
rule, Kirkpatrick v. Stainer.J7 In that case, Stainer, an agent in New York,
acting for his principal, insured a quantity of coffee which had been shipped
by the plaintiff, Kirkpatrick, to Stainer's principal in Trieste. The consign-
ment was not paid for, and Kirkpatrick sued the agent. The New York
court refused to hold the agent, saying that Story had stated the rule. of
liability of agents of foreign principals "in too strong and unqualified
terms", as if the presumption of exclusive credit to the agent or factor "were
a universal inference of law, applicable everywhere". Decisions by the
supreme courts of Maine, Louisiana and Pennsylvania 7S followed Story's
statement of the rule, without questioning its application to American trade.
But in Taintor v. Prendergast,79 decided in 1842, the New York court
adhered to the rule of Kirkpatrick v. Stainer. Barry v. Page,"° a Massachu-
setts case, decided in 1858, followed Taintor v. Prendergast, saying that
"the later and better opinion is, . . . that a principal, whether foreign or
domestic, may sue to recover the price of goods sold by his factor, unless
it is made affirmatively to appear that exclusive credit was given to the
agent by proof, other than the mere fact that the principal resided in another
state or country". Bray v. Kettell, decided by the same court in I86I,81
declared the "supposed" rule expressed by Story "too broad and compre-
hensive". The Supreme Court of the United States, in Oelrichs v. Ford,
2
decided in 1859. also rejects the rule as stated in the earlier authorities. In
1886, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed its earlier opinion,8 3 and
adopted the view of Story in the sixth edition of his work on Agency, say-
ing that the author had yielded "a cheerful compliance with modern adjudi-
cations on the subject matter". In McKeen v. Boothby,84 the Supreme Court
c' See cases cited infra notes 86, 87, 88, and 89.
Supra note ii.
McKenzie v. Nevius, 22 Me. I38, 143 (1842); Rogers v. March, 33 Me. io6, 112
(I85I); New Castle Mfg. Co. v. Red River Co., i Rob. 145, 149 (La. 1841); Merrick's
Estate, 5 W. & S. 9 (Pa. 1842).
703 Hill 72 (N. Y. 1842).
SO Gray 398 (Mass. 1858).
8I Allen 8o, 83 (Mass. 1861). Followed in Kaulbach v. Churchill, 59 N. H. 296
(879). "It is not unusual for underwriters, when making insurance .or persons abroad, to
require the absolute engagement of factors or brokers here, of whose ability they are satis-
fied." Stackpole v. Arnold. II Mass. 27. 33 (1814). This is the root of the idea in the rule
of foreign principal.
5223 How. 49 (U. S. 1859).
STORY, AGENCY (6th ed. 1863) § 268. Maury v. Ranger, 38 La. Ann. 485, 488 (1886).
' Supra note 73.
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of Maine also reversed the earlier opinion in Rogers v. Marsh, saying that
while the fact that the principal is a foreigner is not immaterial, yet it is to
be considered only where the contract is ambiguous. McKeen v. Boothby
was decided October 28, 1930. In Bauman v. Light, 5 decided by the Su-
preme Court of New York, May 6, 1930, it was held that the New York
agent of a principal in Buenos Aires was not liable for the balance due on
goods purchased by the agent for the foreign principal. Bray v. Kettell, 0
Vawter v. Baker, 7 The Suliote 8 and Barhara v. Bell,"9 hold that the rule
has no application between residents of different states in this country.
Thorne v. Tait,9 ° Oelrichs v. Ford,9 Kaulback v. Churchill 92 and Barry v.




Four cases, decided in the eighteenth century, are usually cited to estab-
lish the origin of the doctrine of undisclosed principal. In two of these
cases, the principal was disclosed, and in two he was undisclosed. None
of the cases deals with the central idea in the doctrine, namely the rights
and liabilities of the undisclosed principal with respect to the third party;
this was developed later.95 They involve either the relation between the
third party and the agent, or between the undisclosed principal and the agent.
But all these cases have one fact in common, namely, the principal was a
foreigner who dealt through a native or English merchant. According to
a commercial custom of that day, the English agent of a foreign principal
was assumed to pledge his own credit, regardless of whether the foreign
principal was disclosed or not disclosed. Two of the cases were expressly
decided according to this custom (Gonzalez v. Sladen, de Gaillion v. l'Aigle).
'Bauman Rubber Co. v. Light & Sons, Inc., et al., 137 Misc. 2.58, 244 N. Y. Supp.
448 (1930).
' Supra note 8I.0423 Ind. 63 (1864).
83 23 Fed. gig (E. D. N. Y. 1885).
112 N. C. 131, 16 S. E. 903 (1893).
°8 La. Ann. 8 (1853).
"Supra note 82.
'_ Supra note 81.
Supra note 8o.
'WHARTON, AGENCY (1876) 529, states that while the states of the American Union
are in some senses foreign to each other, yet so far as concerns the reason of the rule asserted
by the defendant (the rule of foreign principal), they do not bear the same reciprocal relations
as does one of these states to a transatlantic country.
' It has been said, doubtingly, that the doctrine of undisclosed principal was "known to
Lord Holt" (1689-1710). Holmes, op. cit. supra note 3, at 368, 392. No authority is cited
,for this statement, and it would seem to be open to question. The undisclosed principal is
admitted to the charmed circle of the contract, though he was not formally a party when the
contract was made. No doubt this is fair, because the undisclosed principal authorized the
contract and in most cases he receives consideration for it. Therefore, it is rather by a
technicality that the undisclosed principal is excluded from the contract after all. But early
law always tends to overemphasize considerations founded on technicalities. The adoption of
a rule which disregards technical considerations belongs to the maturity, not to the formative
period, of legal growth.
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A third (Gurratt v. Cullum) merely held that an undisclosed principal may
recover from his agent money received by the agent for his principal. The
fourth (Scrimshire v. Alderton) is not clear, but turns rather on the fact
of fraud. Contemporary writers considered that all these cases established
the rule of "foreign principal" based on the commercial custom, not the rule
of undisclosed principal. It follows, therefore, that the rule of undisclosed
principal was preceded by the rule of foreign principal.
The commercial custom involved was the outgrowth of medieval trade
rivalries, and the English judges had recast it in the form of a rule of law.
Foreign merchants were well organized, and Englishmen had long sought
to suppress them, at least in retail trade. Finally Parliament passed a statute
prohibiting foreigners from selling at retail, and also from selling to other
foreigners. Even after the statute, foreigners continued to sell at retail,
but they were obliged to transact business through English agents, who
posed as the principals themselves. This statute was in effect from the close
of the fourteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century, and expressed
the popular prejudice of an age which regarded the foreigner as a natural
enemy. The statute applied to domestic commerce. Foreign commerce
was affected in the same way as the result of another Act of Parliament,
passed toward the close of the fifteenth century. This act imposed heavier
duties on goods brought in by foreigners than by English importers. To
escape the higher duty, foreign owners of goods had English agents bring
them in under their own names, as if they were the real owners. This prac-
tice became so common that it acquired a name, "coverture", by which it is
called in the statutes of the period. Of course, in every age and for various
reasons, agents have not disclosed their principals, foreigners and natives,
but from the end of the fourteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century,
English agents had very strong motives to conceal the fact whenever they
acted for foreigners, both in domestic and in foreign commerce. It was in
this period that courts decided the cases usually referred to as establishing
the doctrine of undisclosed principal. Actually, these cases lay down the rule
of foreign principal. It was thought that this rule would reduce the pres-
sure of foreign competition by putting a burden on the Englishman who
acted for foreigners. Of course it was also easier to enforce a contract
against another Englishman than against one "beyond the seas".
These motives passed away in the eighteenth century. English mer-
chants were established in the control of their own commerce and the for-
eign trader was no longer unwelcome. Accordingly the judges moulded
the rule of foreign principal to suit the changed conditions. As long as the
foreigner was disliked and distrusted, the judges excluded him from the
contract and bound his agent instead. The injustice of such a rule to the
English agent was ignored or not perceived. Let him protect himself by
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
taking security, if need be. Exclude the foreigner; it matters not whether
he was disclosed or undisclosed. But when the merchant class no longer
opposed the foreigner, the injustice of the rule became apparent. The for-
eigner had authorized the contract; why not hold him liable upon it, provided
the third party be willing. Of course if he was disclosed, the third party
dealt with him and not with the agent. If he was not disclosed then let the
third party elect between them. The rule of foreign principal, then, bound
the agent only. The rule of undisclosed principal took over the liability of
the agent, but added to it, in the alternative, the liability of a principal.
With the organization of international trade and credit, the "rule"
of foreign principal lost all form of a rule; whether the third party intended
to deal with an agent or with his foreign principal came to be only a ques-
tion of fact. After some wavering at first, out of deference to English
precedent, this has always been the position of the American courts. The
earliest form of the rule, namely, the absolute non-liability of the foreign
principal, and the later form, namely, a rebuttable presumption of non-ia-
bility,-successively disappeared. Changed conditions in trade wrought a
complete revision. Today there is no commercial custom to reject the for-
eign principal, and hence we find it stated that there is now no rule of for-
eign principal. Among the manifold influences shaping the growth of law,
trade has always held a strong place. The Woolsack in the House of Lords
perpetually reminds legislators of this fact. With the skill to create the
rule of foreign principal when it was needed, and with the courage to ignore
it when it had served the purpose, the judges do not need any reminder.
